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Abortion Rights in America
Joan R. Bullock*
In the United States, a trend is emerging where "freedom
of choice" is used to c o ~ o t e"freedom from responsibility."
However, responsibility is required for the fruitful exercise of
any freedom. In order to act responsibly, one must give due
consideration to the consequences of various courses of action
and be willing to accept the consequences flowing from the
chosen action. Freedom of choice, therefore, should not be
interpreted as the freedom to remove oneself from the
consequences of one's own actions. Unfortunately, when it
comes to the issue of abortion, many individuals interpret
freedom of choice as exactly that-the freedom from accepting
the consequences of one's actions.' It should be noted at the
outset that this "freedom of choice" is exercised not only by
women but also by men who support or urge their wives or
significant others to have abortions in order that they too can
be free from accepting the consequences of their actions.'
Each of us, while growing up, was given more freedom as
we matured. This was a sign that our parents, or other care
providers, believed that we were mature enough, not so much
to enjoy the freedom, but more to handle the responsibilities
that came with the freedom. It was important that our
maturity evidenced our ability to accept responsibility for the
consequences of our actions. If we were later found unable to
guide ourselves responsibly while exploring the limits of our
newfound freedom, it was taken away until we matured
sufficiently to again convince our care providers that we were
indeed worthy of that desired freedom. This was done to teach

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. BA.
1980, Michigan State University; J.D. 1983, University of Toledo College of Law;
M.BA. 1988, University of Michigan.
1. See inF& note 17 and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 8 and accompanying text.
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us that true freedom requires responsible action and that irresponsible action or carelessness towards that freedom would
eventually enslave us by the dangers latent in experiencing
that f r e e d ~ m . ~
Now that we are adults making our voices heard in society,
many of us have lost sight of this simple but important lesson
of life. Instead, we engage in self-justifying rhetoric in order to
enjoy (and abuse) our freedom while we shun the consequences
of our actions. Such self-justification can be found in the
rhetoric of many who view abortion as a viable alternative t o
traditional methods of birth control. It is true that restricting
abortions can place an ominous burden on women; but it need
not be so. The mere fact that only women can biologically give
birth does not make childbearing and childrearing solely a
woman's issue. Instead, it is, and should be, a societal issue, in
which men should play a major role.
It is interesting to note that while men revelled in the
sexual freedom gained from the "sexual revolution" of the
1960s, there emerged a new underclass of poverty largely
comprised of women and children4 More women are having
children with no financial or other support from men;5 divorces
are increasing at an alarming rate6 with many women being

3. For example, one should not drive an automobile without first
understanding the operation of the vehicle and having an appreciation of the
dangers inherent in driving. Further, an individual should not have the freedom to
drink alcoholic beverages until one has the capacity to understand the effect of
alcohol on one's body and an appreciation of the dangers to oneself and to others
when too much alcohol is consumed. Lastly, one should not decide to have children
unless there is first an appreciation of the responsibility required to raise children
properly.
4. In her critique of individualism, Elizabeth Fox-Genovese noted that the
shift from communitarianism to individualism has resulted in disadvantaging
women who had previously been cared for by social institutions, such as marriage,
leaving them with the empty notion of individualism with no substantive
liberation. ELIZAEIETH
FOX-GENOVESE,
FEMINISMWITHOUTIILUSIONS40-41 (1991).
5. Mlore than a third of all noneustodial parents (usually fathers) ignore
the obligation to support their children, and many others pay only a
fraction of what they owe. Only one single parent in four receives the
full amount of court-ordered child support . . . .
This is not because most fathers cannot pay. . . . But they do not
feel a sense of personal responsibility for th&-children . . . .
NATIONALCOMM'N
ON CHILDREN,BEYOND
RKETORIC:
A NEW AMERICAN
AGENDA
FOR CHILDREN
AND FAMILIES, SUMMARY,
FINAL REPORT30 (1991) (footnote omitted).
6. William J. Goode, World Changes in Divorce Patterns, in ECONOMIC
OF DIVORCE:
THE INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE
11, 13, 16, 22
CONSEQUENCES
(Lenore J. Weitzman & Mavis Maclean eds., 1992).

,
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forced to become the sole providers for their families.' These
facts support the notion that society, and particularly men, are
shifting the burden of responsible action, i.e., the foreplanning
and the responsibilities inherent in raising children, onto
women? To make matters worse, those who embrace the
abortion rights argument subscribe t o this line of thinking.
Implicit in the argument of those who view abortion rights only
in terms of the right of the woman to her own body, with men
having no role in the abortion decision, is the assumption that
childbearing and childrearing are issues that concern only
women. They commit to the woman alone responsibility for
handling these issues.
The purpose of this Article is not to relegate women to
reproductive enslavement; rather, the purpose of this Article is
to raise the question of whether abortion is an answer to the
numerous inequalities that confront many women when there
is an unwanted pregnancy, or whether abortion exacerbates the
inequalities by encouraging the subordination of women to
men. There is the additional question of whether the judicial
system is the appropriate forum for deciding the abortion
issue-an issue that invokes high emotions and one that is
fraught with deeply held and divergent moral convictions. It is
my opinion that abortion has provided women with only an
illusion of choice rather than meaningful choice because the
societal value systems currently in place devalue and oppress
women.
A handful of recent studies . . . have begun to map out the
contours of divorce settlements in the no-fault era. . . . These studies
indicate in general a decrease in every facet of women's settlements
as compared with settlements under fault regimes. Alimony is granted
less frequently, in smaller amounts, and for shorter durations.
Similarly, child support awards shrank in size and were granted less
often. Women also received smaller shares of the family assets and
greater shares of the family debt.
James B. McLindon, Separate but Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce for
Women and Children, 21 FAM.L.Q. 351, 352 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
The . . . data [from another study] . . . reinforces the conclusion drawn
by other researchers that a woman's chance of becoming poor increases
greatly after divorce. . . . Economically, the father's standard of living
increases dramatically after the divorce . . . .
Id. at 394-95.
8. "Many men support women's right to abortion because they perceive that
if women believe that they can engage in intercourse without having to accept an
unwanted pregnancy, they will become more sexually available." SUSANSHERWIN,
N O LONGERPATIENT:
FEMINIST
ETHICSAND HEALTHCARE115 (1992).
7.
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The divergent, deeply held convictions manifested by our
pluralistic society dictate that justice would be better served by
attempting to resolve the abortion issue via the legislative
process rather than by judicial fiat. Notwithstanding Roe v.
Wade,' there has never been a consensus of approval for
providing women with a n unrestricted right to abort their
unborn. As Justice Scalia remarked in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services,''
[The Court has awarded itself] sovereignty over a field where
i t has little proper business since the answers to most of the
cruel questions posed are political and not juridical-a
sovereignty which therefore quite properly, but to the great
damage of the Court, makes it the object of the sort of
organized public pressure that political institutions in a
democracy ought to receive."

The legislative system is better equipped to wrangle with the
differing views in order to produce a result which, although not
receiving uniform consensus, can provide the populace with a
sense that each view was considered and represented i n
reaching the result.

11. THE RATIONALE FOR ABORTION
Over 1.5 million abortions are performed in the United
States every year.12 In 1988, Aida Torres and Jacqueline
Forrest asked 1900 women to explain why they had an
abortion. Of the women surveyed, arguably over 70% had used
abortion as a method of birth control.13 Fewer than 1% of all
abortions are performed because the pregnancy was the result
of rape or incest." Although the reasons why women who
were not victims of rape or incest or whose lives were not

9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
11. Id. at 532 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
R
FACTSIN BRIEF:ABORTIONIN THE
12. THE ALAN G ~ M A C H E INSTFTUTE,
UNITED STATES1 (1993) [hereinafter FACTS]. 7.n 1988, there were 1.6 million
abortions in the United States. From 1973 through 1988, more than 22 million
legal abortions took place in the United States. Since 1967, when many states
began liberalizing their abortion laws, almost 24 million legal abortions have been
performed." Id.
13. See Aida Torres & Jacqueline D. Forrest, Why Do W o r n Have
Abortions?, 20 FAM.PLAN.PERSP.169, 169-70, 176 (1988).
14. In 1988, only 16,000 of the 1.6 million abortions occurred as a result of
rape or incest. FACTS,supra note 12, at 1.
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threatened by pregnancy chose to have an abortion varied, the
majority were concerned about how a baby would change their
lives, whether they were ready for the responsibility, whether
others would discover they had had sex or were pregnant, and
whether the relationship they were in was stable.15 Further,
statistics published by The Alan Guttmacher Institute indicate
that, of the total number of pregnancies among American
women, 50% are unintended and 50% of that number are
terminated by abortion.16 These statistics, coupled with the
reasons women have abortions, suggest that there is either
inadequate foreplanning or a lack of concern for the consequences of sexual activity." Although the abovementioned
reasons are valid, these are important concerns both women
and men should sincerely consider before engaging in sexual
activity. Doing so is the beginning of responsible action.
Among developed countries, the United States has one of
the higher abortion rates.'' In fact, it has been estimated that
the rates of abortion and unintended pregnancy in the United
States are about five times those of the Netherlands.'' With
such alarming statistics of unintended pregnancies and the
high number of abortions, it is this author's conclusion that the
availability of abortion and its ease of procurement have
discouraged women and men from engaging in responsible
action such as foreplanning, traditional birth control methods
and abstinen~e.~'These high numbers reflect an emerging
value system where individuals shun responsibility for their
actions and society lacks concern for the plight of its individual
members.
In 1921, Margaret Sanger, the founder of the forerunner t o
Planned Parenthood, stressed the importance of responsible
action, stating:

15. Torres & Forrest, supra note 13, at 170.
16. FACTS,supra note 12, a t 1.
17. "The level of unintended pregnancy is in part a reflection of poor
contraceptive practice among American women." Torres & Forrest, supra note 13,
at 176 (citation omitted).
18. FACTS,supra note 12, a t 1.
19. Id.
20. "The available data . . . indicate that abortion has . . . become a primary
method of birth control. . . . By providing unrestricted access to abortion
throughout the first six months of pregnancy, Roe (and now Casgr) discourage
women and men from exercising sexual responsibility." Steven R. Hemler, Richard
G. Wilkins & Frank H. Fischer, Abortion: A PrincipZed Politics, NATX REV., Dec.
27, 1993, at 40, 41.
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Responsible sex-action requires forethought, and
irresponsible action is immoral. Every civilization involves an
increasing forethought for others, even for those unborn. The
reckless abandonment of the moment and the careless regard
for the consequences, is not morality. . . . Nature's way of
reducing her numbers is controlled by disease and famine.
Primitive man achieved the same results by infanticide,
abandonment of children, or abortion . . .

Discounting this concern for responsible sex-action, some
argue that abortions must remain legal so as not to enslave
women via their bodies.22 This argument plays upon the
sympathies of the American public by parading images of
women who are subjected to rape and incest and who then will
be further traumatized by being forced t o carry an unwanted
child to term? These sympathies also embrace the poor
women who, through no choice of their own as to their
economic circumstances, will be forced to b ~ more
g children
into the world, serving only to stretch the circle of poverty and
increase the burden on the national welfare system?

21. MADELINE GRAY,MARGARET SANGER:
A BIOGRAPHY
OF THE CHAMPION
OF
BIRTHCONTROL
174 (1979).
22. [Tlhose who would outlaw abortion . . . would rely upon economic and
physiological circumstances-the supposed dictates of the natural-to
conscript women . . . as involuntary incubators and thus to usurp a
control over sexual activity and its consequences that men . . . take
for granted. To one who regards this outcome as unjust, a right to
end pregnancy might be seen more plausibly as a matter of resisting
sexual and economic domination than as a matter of shielding from
public control "private" transactions . . . .
LAURENCE
H. TRIBE,CONSTITUTIONAL
CHOICES243 (1985).
Although there may be some injustice in requiring women to bear the children
they conceive, it is important to comment that it is not the unborn child who has
caused the injustice. It is my opinion that to get rid of the root of the injustice,
the cultural value system which, to paraphrase Mr. Tribe, allows men to engage in
sexual activity and take for granted its consequences, must be dismantled. See
infia notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
23. But, as noted, supra note 14 and accompanying text, rape and incest
account for fewer than 1%of all abortions.
24. It has been argued that making abortions illegal would only make them
so for the poor and that the rich would continue to have abortions. 123 CONG.
REC. 1991 (1977) (statement of Sen. Garn), adapted and reprinted in Jake Garn,
An American Standard, HUM. LIFE REV., Spring 1977, at 43, 44. However, as
Senator Jake Garn indicated in his address to the Senate in 1977, in support of
two life-protecting constitutional amendments, what the rich are able to do is
irrelevant. Id., adapted and reprinted in Garn, supra, at 44. "This country cannot
predicate its laws upon the practices of the wealthy, particularly when such
practices deprive humans of their lives. 'Equal justice under law' does not mean
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Realities bear out, however, that women are already
enslaved--enslaved by an ideology which thrives on selfcentered, competitive superiority to the exclusion and demise of
others and which is buttressed by moral decay. For example,
why are women subjected to rape and incest? Why is there a
tendency in rape laws to hold the woman responsible for the
crime committed against her by putting her on trial for being
raped?25 Further, why are women without economic
opportunities such that their only "logical" choice is to abort?
Why is there not a better system in place to force non-custodial
fathers to pay for the rearing of their children? These questions
point to the real enslavement of women. Our culture's ideology
of self-centered, competitive superiority uses domination and
oppression to enslave women. If women want true "freedom of
choice," then the use of abortion to counteract "reproductive
enslavement" is not the answer.
It is the author's opinion that the availability and the ease
of procurement of abortion as a method of birth control
encourages the irresponsible action of both men and
which leads to this "enslavement." Abortion allows many men
to perceive women as more available for them sexually.27
Moreover, men are socialized to use sex to oppress women and
women are socialized to be ~ompliant.~'This cultural value
system perpetuates the true "reproductive enslavement" of
women. The use of abortion may eliminate some of the
symptom of oppression through "reproductive enslavement"
but it does not eliminate the oppression. Permitting women to
use abortion as a method of birth control encourages women to
embrace this same ideology of self-centered, competitive
superiority when it comes to the rights of the fetus.
The dangers of such an ideology have been manifest in the
past. Semantics and legal rationalizations were employed to
nullify the rights of others and justify the enslavement of
African-Americans,Zg the killing of Jews:'
and countless

that legislatures and courts must legitimize the foibles, attitudes, and evils of the
rich." Garn, supra, at 44.
25. See Report of the Missouri Task Force on Gender and Justice, 58 Mo. L.
REV.485, 612 (1993).
26. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
27. See supra note 8.
28. See infia notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
. the
29. Who is a "person" under the fourteenth amendment is not
sort of question which can be left to individual or local decision. Too

..
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other atrocities through the years.31 Similar semantics and
justifications are present in the debate over the rights of a n
unborn life.
Such sundry justifications are also advanced in the
economic realm. Obviously, abortions save the government
money when compared to government funding of social
.~~
programs for the poor when abortion is r e ~ t r i c t e d Further,
abortions permit women and men alike freedom to pursue goals
of self-realization without being impeded by unwanted or
burdensome children. Nonetheless, the awful truth is that
those who view abortion as a necessary evil balance and find
wanting the life of the fetus against dollars saved or careers

many basic rights hinge upon the answer. Are blacks, Jews or others,
"persons"? The questions about foeti, blacks and others are not merely
similar. They are the same questions-how do we define a human
being, separately entitled to respect and value?
Joseph W. D e l l a p e ~ a ,Nor Piety nor Wit: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 6
COLUM.HUM.RTS. L. REV. 379, 399 (1974-75).
By concluding . . . that the foetus could be no more than potential
life, the Court [as in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)l has gained
support by sacrificing invisible people. . . . Will future generations ponder
these abortion decisions with the same incredulity with which many have
come to view the segregation decisions?
Id. at 409.
30. Dr. Leo Alexan'der, who served as an expert at the Nuremberg trials of
the physicians who developed the German euthanasia program and, subsequently,
the medical experiments and genocide carried out by the Nazis, wrote:
Whatever proportions these crimes finally assumed, it became evident
to all who investigated them that they had started from small beginnings.
The beginnings at first were merely a subtle shift in emphasis in the
basic attitude of the physicians. It started with the acceptance of the
attitude, basic in the euthanasia movement, that there is such a thing as
life not worthy to be lived. This attitude in its early stages concerned
itself merely with the severely and chronically sick. Gradually the sphere
of those to be included in this category was enlarged to encompass the
socially unproductive, the ideologically unwanted, the racially unwanted
and finally all non-Germans. But it is important to realize that the
infinitely small wedged-in lever from which this entire trend of mind
received its impetus was the attitude toward the nonrehabilitable sick.
Leo Alexander, Medical Science Under Dictatorship, 241 NEW ENG.J. MED. 39, 44
(1949).
31. See Nat Hentoff, The Small Beginnings' of Death, HUM.LIFE REV., Spring
1988, a t 53, 53 (recording the trend of the courts to intervene and allow the
killing of born individuals through euthanasia, who are deemed to have "li[ves]
not worthy t o be lived'") (quoting Alexander, supra note 30, at 44).
32. For every $1.00 spent by government to pay for abortions for poor
women, about $4.00 are saved in public medical and welfare expenditures incurred
as a result of the unintended birth. FACTS,supra note 12, at 2.
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achieved or other self-serving endeavors. Who among us would
like our lives reduced to such a simple equation?33
If we are honest about the plight of women and the welfare
of our children, then we have to realize that abortion, while a
short-term "fix," is not the answer to the oppression and
inequalities women face. The use of abortion for purposes of
birth control provides a n illusion of choicea but not true
"freedom of choice" for women because our social culture
devalues and oppresses women.35 Further, by strategically
framing the issue of abortion in terms of a woman's rights,
abortion remains specifically an individual "woman's problem."
Such issue framing places the decision for childbearing and
childrearing on the woman and is a sign of a society trying to
divorce and distance itself from responsible action.36 Indeed,
33. Abraham Lincoln understood how people could use semantics in order to
accomplish their selfish desires when he wrote:
Made so plain by our good Father in Heaven, that all feel and
understand it, even down to brutes and creeping insects. The ant, who
has toiled and dragged a crumb to his nest, will furiously defend the
fruit of his labor, against whatever robber assails him. So plain, that the
most dumb and stupid slave that ever toiled for a master, does constantly
know that he is wronged. So plain that no one, high or low, ever does
mistake it, except in a plainly selfish way; for although volume upon
volume is written to prove slavery a very good thing, we never hear of
the man who wishes to take the good of it, by being a slave himself.
Abraham Lincoln, Fragment on Slavery, in 2 THE COLLECTED
WORKSOF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN,1848-1858, at 222, 222 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
This same reasoning can be applied to the abortion debate. It has been argued
that abortion is good for the child that may be unwanted, abused or poor if born.
However, if this argument is valid, then why do we not hear these same people
pushing for the deaths of those that are rejected, abused and poor?
34. We see the woman who, without support, often feels she has "too
much to lose" by continuing an unwanted pregnancy. She is the one
whose college peers are most apt to say, 'You should have been
smarter than that. This isn't supposed to happen to someone like
you." She is the one whose boss is still apt to find a good excuse for
terminating her employment and whose family is still apt to respond
with shame and rejection.
.*..
I have found that there are [multiple] sources of pressure directed
toward a woman facing this most personal and vital crisis. The
influences end up having a lot more to do with impossible trade-offs
and Catch-22s imposed by those with vested interests than a
liberating opportunity to express freedom of choice. To put it simply,
the vast majority of women who submit themselves and their babies
to abortion do so, not by "choice," but because they feel they have no
other choice.
Mary C. Agee, Practical Compassion, HUM. LIFE REV., Fall 1991, at 48, 50-51.
35. See infia notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
36. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. Other examples include our
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unintended pregnancies and the burden of childrearing should
Until women realize this and push for
be a societal ~oncern.~'
real change, i.e., a dismantling of society's current value
systems which serve t o oppress women, society, and
particularly men, will not be held accountable and women will
continue t o be enslaved.

FORUM
THE PROPER
BATTLEGROUND
111. IS THE JUDICIAL
FOR THE ABORTIONDEBATE?
In Roe u. Wade:' the United States Supreme Court
decided, by judicial fiat, that women have a fundamental right
under the Constitution t o have an abortion prior to the time of
fetal viability. It has been contended that this Supreme Court
decision, through its failure to explore the moral underpinnings
surrounding the abortion issue, created the current abortion
debate.39
[Tlhe Supreme Court in Roe . . . ruled that unless the unborn
child is viable, the only legally significant moral factor is the
mother's desire. All other moral considerations were declared
to be constitutionally irrelevant. The [law struck down in Roe]
denied the moral dilemmas involved in pregnancies resulting
from rape or incest, in pregnancies involving severe and
medically untreatable birth defects, with maternal healthimpairing pregnancies, and others-moral dilemmas which,
by the 1960s, troubled most Americans. Likewise, the Roe
rule of abortion on demand completely disregards the moral
dilemmas of the use of abortion for birth control, for financial
reasons, for population control, and for other reasons of mere
social convenience, which trouble most Americans today."

Because of our diverse society, it is doubtful that there can
a uniform consensus on the propriety of abortion. Whether

society's response to the failure of affirmative action to meaningfully incorporate
minorities into the "American Dream," by calling it a "minority," or more
particularly, a "Black problem"; and our society's growing response to the
difficulties facing its elderly, terminally ill, mentally ill and otherwise challenged
individuals by allowing them to "die with dignity" before they become completely
without value and a greater burden on the national welfare system.
37. As is said in an African proverb of unknown authorship, "It takes a
whole village to raise a child."
38. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
39. LYNN D. WARDLE& MARY ANNE Q. WOOD,A LAWYER LOOKS AT
ABORTION
205 (1982).
40. Id. at 207.

ABORTION RIGHTS IN AMERICA
to bear a child and, more importantly, whether to require a
woman to bear a child rather than allow her to abort the fetus
are emotionally charged questions whose answers are embraced
in deeply held beliefs. Accordingly, the use of the judicial
system to answer the important question on the future viability
of abortion as an alternative to traditional methods of birth
control will not resolve the issue. The judicial system cannot
provide a solution that is workable because it is not a forum in
which the moral concerns of the people can be weighed in a
balance that is right for them." What is needed is a forum
where the people can be involved in the decisionmaking
process. The forum must permit people to communicate their
concerns regarding abortion and allow them to work towards a
solution that is amenable to all. The forum best qualifled for

41. Michael Perry had indicated that, although the Constitution did not
support a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy as a right of privacy,
[tlhe dimensions of the right of privacy invoked in Roe are determined
not by the Constitution but by conventional morality. Consequently, to say
that the right of privacy protects a woman's decision to have an abortion
is necessarily to say that the objective of prohibiting such decisions lacks
support in conventional morality. To say that is to say the objective is
illegitimate, because conventional morality is the touchstone of the
legitimacy of governmental objectives under substantive due process. Thus,
in Roe the Court did not really balance two competing "goods," but
concluded that the legislation, the objective of which was illegitimate
according to conventional morality, was not a "good" at all.
Michael J. Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond)
Recent Cases, 71 Nw. U . L. REV. 417, 421 (1976) (footnote omitted).
Perry's contention that the Court was accurate in its implicit evaluation of
conventional moral culture was later criticized:
This argument turns on the notion that Roe rests on moral notions
widely shared among the American people. Note however, that this
defense is effective only if the principle of conventional morality is stated
at a relatively high level of generality. If we look at enacted statutes as
evidence of what Americans conventionally believe is correct, we may
acquire a more precise-and quite differentunderstanding of what
conventional morality requires.
GEOFFREY
R. STONE ET AL., C O N ~ I O N A
LAW
L 933 (2d ed. 1991) (emphasis
added).
Perry subsequently modified his views:
Just as there is no singular American tradition sufficiently determinate to
be of help to the Court in resolving particular human rights conflicts, and
just as the concrete traditions that do exist are fragmented and point
every which way, so too there are no consensual values sufficiently
determinate to be of help to the Court, and the values that do enjoy
significant support are, in our pluralist culture, fragmented and point in
many different directions.
MICHAELJ. PERRY,THE CONSI'ITUTION,
THE COURTS, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS94 (1982).
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this is the legislature. Moreover, because of the diversity of the
populace, it is best that the individual state legislatures rather
than the federal legislature handle this issue so that all will
have their views heard and represented. However, within the
current judicial framework, the Court is ill-equipped to address
all the moral bases for and against abortion such that all
people can believe that their views were heard and adequately
repre~ented.'~The Court in Roe hinged its decision on two
points: the right of a woman to her own body and the right of
the woman t o be free of undue interference by the state in her
choice to have an abortion prior to the viability of the fetus.
Since Roe, the Court has acknowledged some of the moral
tensions present in the abortion deci~ion*~
and has also de-

42. For example, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), the
Court considered Pennsylvania's restrictive abortion statute and struck down the
spousal notification clause but upheld the parental consent requirement.
[Tlhe Court failed to accord pregnant adolescent victims of family violence
the same protection it granted similarly victimized pregnant women. . . .
. . . Because children are physically and emotionally dependent on
their parents, minors are more vulnerable to violence and psychological
maltreatment and are more susceptible to developmental setbacks as a
result of such abuse. . . .
Surely an adolescent who fears violence and psychological abuse
should her parents learn of her pregnancy or her intention to have an
abortion is entitled to the same protection as an adult woman who fears
her spouse.
The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV. 163, 207 (1992)
(footnote omitted).
43.
Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. Yet 19 years
a h r our holding that the Constitution protects a woman's right to
terminate her pregnancy in its early stages, that definition of liberty
is still questioned. . . .

....

Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we suppose
some always shall disagree, about the profound moral and spiritual
implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest stage.
Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic
principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own
moral code. . . .

....
. . . As

with abortion, reasonable people will have differences of
opinion about these matters. One view is based on such reverence for
the wonder of creation that any pregnancy ought to be welcomed and
carried to full term no matter how difficult it will be to provide for
the child and ensure its well-being. Another is that the inability to
provide for the nurture and care of the infant is a cruelty to the child
and an anguish to the parent. These are intimate views with infinite
variations . . . .
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moted the right to an abortion from a fundamental right t o a
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth A~nendment.'~
Nonetheless, this acknowledgment has not served to provide
the populace with a sense of representation such that the
abortion issue can be put to rest. The role of morals is even
acknowledged by Laurence Tribe. Initially, he was of the
opinion that the Roe Court was correct in assigning
decisionmaking responsibility to the woman because any
answer to the question of when a separately valued human life
began was necessarily a religious affirmation.45He has since
recanted this opinion, stating:
[My former1 view appears to give too little weight to the value
of allowing religious groups freely to express their convictions
in the political process, underestimates the power of moral
convictions unattached t o religious beliefs on this issue, and
makes the unrealistic assumption that a constitutional ruling
could somehow disentangle religion from future public debate
on the q ~ e s t i o n ? ~

These morals also play a role in the appropriate scope of
judicial review. Harry Wellington expressed this view when he
stated:
Roe perpetuates . . . a basic terminological mistake: The
Court insists on describing the plaintiffs interest a s
"fundamental." This is misleading, for it suggests either that
the' text of the Constitution has singled out the abortion
decision for special attention or that the judge, as wise
philosopher, has imposed his ethical system upon the people.
My claim has been that the plaintiffs interest is protected
under the Fourteenth Amendment by reference to the people:
that the meaning of liberty in that Amendment and its
weight in the context of the Texas abortion statute
depends . . . upon its weight in conventional morality.47

Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2803-08 (citation omitted).
44. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
45. Laurence H. Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a
Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18-25, 2832 (1973).
AMERICANCONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1350 (2d ed. 1988)
46. LAURENCEH. TRIBE,
(emphasis added; footnote omitted).
47. Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Doubk
Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALEL.J. 221, 299 (1973) (footnote
omitted).
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The analysis that follows in this section continues this line
of reasoning and attempts to demonstrate that, although the
Court has tried to address some of the moral concerns
underlying the abortion decision, it has not been successful in
resolving them nor has it negated the public's need for a moral
discourse on the circumstances, if any, in which an abortion
should be allowed and with what restrictions.

A. A Woman Has a Right to Control Her Own Body
In Roe u. Wadep8 the United States Supreme ~ o u k f o u n d
that a woman had a right t o reproductive choice. Her right to
have an abortion was fundamental and could only be impaired
if the state could demonstrate a compelling reason." Evolving
from the right of privacy," a woman's right to reproductive
choice signified her right to control her own body. However,
subsequent cases5' have retreated from the position that reproductive choice is a fundamental right5' and have instead
settled on the notion that reproductive choice is a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." This demotion
from a fimdamental right to a constitutionally protected liberty
interest means that states need only demonstrate that their
regulatory scheme does not unduly burden a woman's choice to
have an abortion.54Consequently, states have greater latitude
in proscribing abortions in those situations which may morally
offend its citizenry than they did immediately after Roe v.
Wade. States can express a preference for childbirth over abortionS5and can demonstrate that preference by allocating pub48. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
49. See id. at 152-55.
50. "This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action . . .
or . . . in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy." Id. at 153.
51. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
52. See generally Walter Dellinger & Gene B. Sperling, Abortion and the Supreme Court: The Retreat from Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA.L. REV.83 (1989) (criticizing the plurality opinion in Webster for not explaining why the right to have an
abortion is no longer fundamental).
53. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804.
54. See id. at 2830.
55. Webster, 492 US. at 509 (upholding a Missouri statute which prohibited
public funding of abortion, restricted the use of public employees and facilities for
the performance of non-therapeutic abortions and required physicians to test for

.
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lic monies to assist in the raising of children rather than for
abortion.56 States can also prohibit the use of public family
planning funds for abortion counseling or referrals."
The argument can be made that by procuring an abortion,
a woman is merely exercising the right to control her own body.
The fallacy of this argument, however, is that this right has
never been ab~olute.~'For example, women are not free t o
commit suicide,5sto introduce illegal substances into their systems, or even to sell their own bodies for sex?' Further, in the
case of the pregnant woman, arguably there are two bodies
involved-that of the mother and that of the developing fet ~ s . Although
~'
Roe indicated that the fetus does not have any
rights entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection,B2 the
Supreme Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health Servicess3
upheld a Missouri statute which stated in its preamble that
"[tlhe life of each human being begins at conception" and that
"[u]nborn children have protectable interests in life, health and
well-being."64By so holding, a plurality of the Court aff'irmed
the right of the State t o determine the point at which its inter-

fetal viability prior to performing abortions).
56. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 324-26 (1980) (holding that a State that
participates in the Medicaid program is not obligated under Title XIX to continue
to h n d those medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement is
unavailable under the Hyde Amendment).
57. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1776-78 (1991) (upholding a Department of Health and Human Services regulation prohibiting federally funded family
planning clinics from counseling or referring women for abortions).
58. "In fact, it is not clear to us that the claim . . . that one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the
right of privacy . . . . The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of
this kind in the past." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
59. From a practical standpoint, a successful suicide is not a chargeable offense for lack of a perpetrator. However, in a failed suicide attempt, steps are
taken to prevent a person from repeating the attempt.
60. With few exceptions, prostitution is illegal in the United States. But see
NEV. REV. STAT.$5 201.295-.440, 269.175 (1991).
61. For example, it is not possible for one body to have two different blood
types. However, a pregnant woman can be RH negative with a blood type of B
and the fetus can be RH positive with a blood type of AB. This fact alone demonstrates that the fetus is a separate intrauterine being. See also i n f b note 70 and
accompanying text.
62. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157-58.
63. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
64. Id. at 504 n.4 (quoting Mo.REV. STAT.$8 1.205.1(1), (2) (1986)). The US.
Supreme Court upheld this language, holding that the preamble of the Missouri
statute was merely a declaration that did not regulate abortion in any way.
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est in preserving fetal life is sufficiently compelling to justify
regulating abortion.65

B. A Woman Has a Right to Be Free of Undue Influence
by the State in Her Choice to Have a n Abortion
Prior to Viability of the Fetus
The Court in Roe v. Wade acknowledged that the woman's
right to her own body in her decision to have a n abortion was
not absolute and could be infringed upon by the State a t the
point of viability.66
The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy.
She carries an embryo and, later, a fetus . . . . [Ilt is reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that at some point
in time another interest, that of health of the mother or that
of potential human life, becomes significantly involved. The
woman's privacy is no longer sole and any right of privacy she
possesses must be measured accordingly.67

The point of viability is a n important moment because it signals the time when the State's interest i n maternal health and
the developing human life becomes suffciently compelling to
justify abortion restrictions. As medical technology increases
and becomes more refined, the viability of the fetus moves
closer and closer to the point of conception. As Justice
O'Connor e g u e d in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
The Roe framework, then, is clearly on a collision course
with itself. As the medical risks of various abortion procedures decrease, the point a t which the State may regulate for
reasons of maternal health is moved W h e r forward to actual

65. In urging the abandonment of the Roe trimester framework, three Justices stated, "we do not see why the State's interest in protecting potential human
life should come into existence only at the point of viability, and that there should
therefore be a rigid line allowing state regulation after viability but prohibiting it
before viability." Id. at 519 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White
and K e ~ e d y JJ.).
,
66. Specifically, viability is defined as the point at which the fetus "has the
capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb." Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
Therefore, viability also presumably includes survival outside the mother's womb
with the assistance of medical technology. See, e-g., infra text accompanying note
69.
67. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
68. 462 US. 416 (1983); cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, K e ~ e d y and
,
Souter, JJ.).
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childbirth. As medical science becomes better able to provide
for the separate existence of the fetus, the point of viability is
moved further back toward conception. . . . The Roe framework is inherently tied t o the state of medical technology that
exists whenever particular litigation ensues."

Theoretically, it is possible for the point of viability t o converge
with the point of conception since the zygote, or fertilized egg,
at the instance of conception, has all the genetic and other
information needed to develop into a healthy human being?
the only thing needed is a proper environment.
The absurdity of looking at viability as the point where the
fetus can survive independently outside its environment is
illustrated by the following question: Who among us can survive independently outside our proper environment? If a person
is forcefully removed from the Earth and blasted off to Mars
without the proper gear to sustain life, he or she will surely
die. Does such a person lose his or her humanity or personhood
because he or she is not in the proper environment to sustain
Such inconsistencies of the viability test have been recognized. In Webster, the plurality stated that the Roe framework
of trimesters and viability was not found in the text of the
Con~titution.'~
Further, they saw no reason "why the State's
interest in protecting potential human life should come into
existence only at the point of viability . . . . '[Tlhe State's interest, if compelling after viability, is equally compelling before
viability.' "73

69. City of A m n , 462 U.S. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
70. "The fertilized egg or zygote ultimately develops into the adult organism.
The physical characteristics of the adult organism are determined by the information coded in the DNA molecules within the zygote. No information can be added
later. All that is required is present in that single, original cell." T.H. Milby, The
New Biology and the Question of Personhood: Implications for Abortion, 9 AM. J.L.
& MED.31, 35 (1983).
71. For example, the people of Somalia were dying from starvation. Arguably,
their drought-ridden and war-ravaged environment was not capable of sustaining
their lives. Without external assistance, many were doomed to die. Should we have
written them off as non-persons as well?
72. Webster v. Reproductive Health Sews., 492 U.S. 490, 518 (1989) (plurality
opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White and K e ~ e d y JJ.).
,
73. Id. at 519 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White and Kennedy, JJ.) (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 795 (1986) (White, J., dissenting)).
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To distinguish our lives from that of the embryo as actualized life versus potential life misses the point as well.74At the
point of conception, the fertilized ovum is a living cell and is
distinctly humanT5The mere fact that medical science is not
presently advanced enough to nurture the extrauterine fertilized ovum to full development does not mean that the fertilized
ovum is not alive. It only indicates that medical science has not
been able to successfully duplicate the proper environment for
fetal development. Since the fertilized ovum a t the point of
conception has all the information it needs to develop into a
complete and healthy human being,76 it is impossible for the
fertilized ovum to develop into any other type of animal or
plant life. Dr. Bernard Nathanson, M.D., the co-founder of the
and forNational Abortion Rights Action League (NARLXL)~~
mer director of the Center for Reproductive and Sexual Health,
the largest abortion clinic in the nation,78stated that
[als early as six weeks we can detect heart function in embryos, with an electrocardiograph. We can record brain activity

74. As Justice O'Connor aptly stated:
The diffmlty with [the analysis that the State does not have an important and legitimate interest in protecting human life until the point of
fetal viability] is clear: potential life is no less potential in the first weeks
of pregnancy than it is a t viability or afterward. At any stage in pregnancy, there is the potential for human life. . . . The choice of viability as
the point at which the state interest in potential life becomes compelling
is no less arbitrary than choosing any point before viability or any point
afterward.
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 US. 416, 461 (1982)
(O'Co~or,J., dissenting).
75. Stedman's Medical Dictionary defines fertilization as "[tlhe process that
begins with the penetration of the secondary oocyte by the spermatozoon and is
completed with the fusion of the male and female pronuclei." STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL
DICTIONARY516 (23d ed. 1976). In its definition of pronucleus, it states that
"[wlhen the pronuclei merge in fertilization, the diploid number of chromosomes
characteristic of the species is reestablished." Id. at 1148 (emphasis added). Lastly,
Stedman's Medical Dictionay defines a zygote as "[tlhe diploid cell resulting from
union of a sperm and an ovum. . . . The i n d i v i d d that develops from a fertilized
ovum." Id. at 1588 (emphasis added).
76. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
77. Bernard Nathanson, A Righteous Censorship, NEWSDAY,
June 4, 1991, at
56, 56.
78. Id. "As former head of the world's largest abortion clinic . . . 1 bear ultimate responsibility for over 75,000 abortions.' His dramatic move to the pro-life
pulpit evolved, he says, with advances in obstetrics and fetology, which have 'allowed us to perceive without question the unmistakable humanity of the unborn
July
child.'" Kristin McMurran, Picks & Pans-Video: Eclipse of Reuson, PEOPLE,
17, 1989, at 17, 17.
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at eight weeks. Our capacity to measure signs of life is becoming more sophisticated every day, and as time goes by we will
undoubtedly be able to isolate these signs a t earlier and earlier stages in fetal development. To vehemently deny that life
begins when conception begins is absurd!"

Perhaps our existence can be distinguished and justified by
the fact that the fetus's proper environment happens t o be in
the body of another human being. But should such dependence
make the fetus less alive and less human so that it should have
no rights at all in the decision of whether it should be allowed
t o live or die? "The fact that a fetus depends on the placenta for
life and can't survive independently doesn't nullify its existence
as a human being. A diabetic is wholly dependent on insulin,
but that doesn't make him less humadso
The argument is also raised that even though a woman
should or ought t o permit the birth of her unborn child, it does
not follow that the unborn child has a right to be born.'' Judith Thomson, a proponent of this view, advanced a hypothetical situation wherein she compared the right to life of an unborn child with her right to have Henry Fonda save her life.82
She concluded that, although she may be "sick unto death, and
the only thing that will save [her] life is the touch of Henry

Garn, supra note 24, at 46 (quoting Dr. Bernard Nathanson).
Id. (quoting Dr. Nathanson).
Judith J. Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB.Am. 47, 60

In some views having a right to life includes having a right to be
given at least the bare minimum one needs for continued life. But
suppose that what in fact is the bare minimum a man needs for
continued life is something he has no right at all to be given? If I am
sick unto death, and the only thing that will save my life is the
touch of Henry Fonda's cool hand on my fevered brow, then all the
same, I have no right to be given the touch of Henry Fonda's cool
hand on my fevered brow. It would be frightfully nice of him to fly in
from the West Coast to provide it. . . . But I have no right at all
against anybody that he should do this for me. . . .

....
. . . But

suppose he isn't on the West Coast. Suppose he has only
to walk across the room, place a hand briefly on my brow-and lo,
my life is saved. Then surely he ought to do it, it would be indecent
to refuse. Is it to be said "Ah, well, it follows that in this case she
has a right to the touch of his hand on her brow, and so it would be
an injustice in him to rehse"? So that I have a right to it when it is
easy for him to provide it, though no right when it's hard?
Id. at 55, 61.

-
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Fonda's cool hand on [her] fevered brow," she had "no right at
all against anybody that he should do this for [her]."83
The fallacy with this reasoning is that in Thomson's example, Henry Fonda did nothing to cause her impending and
seemingly certain demise. If he had, his subsequent failure to
cross the room or fly from the West Coast to touch his hand on
her brow would be morally reprehensible. He was the one who
initiated the process leading up to her certain death. Therefore,
from a moral standpoint, he should be required to take steps to
prevent her death.
Thomson's fallacious reasoning continues when she contends that, although the woman who aborts may be deemed a
"bad samaritan" for refusing t o assist the child in its quest to
be born, there is no law requiring her, or anyone else for that
matter, to be a "good samaritan."84Accordingly, the argument
continues, a woman should not be required by law t o be a "good
samaritan" and allow her unborn child to use her body for the
complete term of pregnancy.85 Implicit in this argument is
83. Id. at 55.
84. [Ilt is worth drawing attention to the fact that in no state in this
country is any man compelled by law to be even a Minimally Decent
Samaritan to any person . . . . By contrast, in most states in this
country women are compelled by law to be not merely Minimally
Decent Samaritans, but Good Samaritans to unborn persons inside
them.
Id. at 63. This argument is refuted by the fact that a legal duty of affirmative
action arises if a tortfeasor caused the injury.
Justifications for the traditional reluctance of courts to impose affirmative
duties to warn or otherwise act to prevent injury to another include the
impracticability of imposing such duties and a recognition of a defendant's
interest in "keeping to himself' and in not being inconvenienced by a
requirement to a d for the prevention of harm to others. Neither of these
policy justifications outweigh society's interest in preventing avoidable
injuries and providing a remedy to those injured when otherwise innocent
affirmative conduct by a defendant has contributed to the creation of a
danger. In such cases, by limiting liability to those whose actions have
created a hazard, an unmanageable extension of tort liability is avoided.
Further, t o the extent that the defendant had already decided to act in
the manner he did in creating the danger, his interest in self-autonomy is
diminished in importance since he has "already injected himself into the
plaintiff's realm."
Andrulonis v. United States, 724 F. Supp. 1421, 1494 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (citation
L.
omitted) (quoting Shlomo Twerski, wzrmative Duty After Tarasoff, 11 HoREV. 1013, 1025 (1983)), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 924 F.2d
1210 (2d Cir.), vacated sub mm. New York State Dep't of Health v. Andrulonis,
112 S. Ct. 39 (1991); cf H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E.896, 898
(N.Y. 1928).
85. Thornson, supm note 81, at 63.
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that the woman has not contributed t o the condition now requiring her t o be a "good samaritan." However, statistics indicate that only approximately 1%of all abortions are the result
of rape or incest? This means almost all women who receive
abortions do so despite the fact that they and their partner
have deliberately engaged in activity which causes the incidence of pregnancy.87 The good samaritanhad samaritan
analogy does not and should not apply t o situations in which
the person who "ought" to help is the one who caused the plight
of the helpless victim. Therefore, if the purpose of the law is to
make persons accountable for their injurious actions, then
preventing women from having abortions would not, in the
overwhelming majority of cases, work an injustice by forcing
them to become "good samaritans." Indeed, it would be forcing
them t o become ac~ountable.~~
There is a tension, however, that arises when a person is
forced to become accountable-a tension between the right to
self-autonomy and societal concerns. John Stuart Mill suggests
a resolution t o this tension:
What, then, is the rightbl limit to the sovereignty of the
individual over [herlself? Where does the authority of society
begin? How much of human life should be assigned to individuality, and how much to society?
. . . To individuality should belong the part of life in
which it is chiefly the individual that is interested; to society,
the part which chiefly interests society.
. . . [Elveryone who receives the protection of society
owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in society
renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe
a certain line of conduct toward the rest. This conduct consists, first, in not injuring the interests of one another, or
rather certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as
rights; and secondly, in each person's bearing Ifierl share . . .
of the labors and sacrifices incurred for defending the society
or its members from injury and molestation. These conditions
society is justified in enforcing a t all costs to those who en-

86. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
87. The author recognizes that nearly 2Wo of women have abortions because
of circumstances beyond their control, such as fetal deformity and maternal health
problems. Torres & Forrest, supra note 13, at 170.
88. Accountability in this context means to accept consequences, i.e., the benefits and risks flowing from one's deliberate actions or omissions.
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deavor to withhold fulfillment. . . . As soon as any part of a
person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others,
society has jurisdiction over i t . . . .89

In short, when others can be injured by our choices that are
motivated, not by necessity, but by our desire for self-realization and well-being enhancement, we should be required to
refrain from Mfilling our individual desires.g0Such a commitment to the common good is necessary for justice and fairness
to be accorded to all members of society.
In order for members of society to be willing to sacrifice for
the common good, they must first engage in a moral discourse
to determine the level and extent of the sacrifices needed in
order to accomplish an objective benefitting society as a whole.
To require sacrifice without this discourse can cause a sense of
estrangement among individuals and groups who believe that
their concerns were not considered. Because of this estrangement, individuals and other underrepresented groups often
resort to legal recourse using rights-based arguments. The use
of legal recourse a t this stage can be detrimental to the common good when the issues sought to be resolved have moral
underpinnings. When the judicial system addresses the rightsbased arguments without considering all of the moral dilemmas
surrounding the issue, a controversy is sparked.
Such was the case in Roe u. Wade because it prohibited
states from taking any action premised on their citizens' moral
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg echoed
objections to ab~rtion.~'

89. JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY73 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978).
90. Since only women will be required to refrain from abortions, men should
be required to sacrifice financially and the community at large should be required
to restructure in such a way as to provide meaningfbl accommodations for people
with families.
91.
I t is popularly believed that Roe legalized abortion on demand
only during the first trimester. This is not true, for the Court held in
Roe that a woman's decision whether or not to have an abortion could
not be regulated at all before viability . . . . The end of the first
trimester is only significant in that it marks the point at which the
state may presumably regulate the medical aspects of abortion . . . .
But during the second trimester, until viability, the state may not
restrict or interfere with the right of the woman to choose to have an
abortion for any reason, or for no reason whatever. And even after
viability, the Supreme Court said, the state cannot prohibit abortions
necessary to save the life or health of the mother . . Thus, the
Court effectively mandated legalized abortion on demand until viability, and, depending on the interpretation of "health," possibly afterward
as well.

. .
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this sentiment when she concluded that the Court in Roe
should have merely declared the Texas criminal abortion statute unconstitutional, rather than proceeding on and supplanting every state abortion law then in force.g2Roe then, represents a failure of the judicial system to serve as the "weather
vane" of opinion when the issues that need t o be resolved have
divergent moral bases.

IV. EFFECTING
TRUESOCIALCHANGE
In my experience, I have found that both sides of the abortion controversy can agree that abortion represents a tragedy." For abortion proponents, it is seen as an all-too-necessary evil. For abortion opponents, the obvious tragedy is the
termination of the unborn life. It is doubtful whether the prolife and pro-choice forces will agree on the propriety and morality of abortion.g4However, these two forces should be able to
agree that abortion is not a procedure that one should strive t o
obtain because it is good in and of itself. Therefore, the focus of
any fruitful meeting between pro-life and pro-choice forces
should be on developing strategies to eliminate the necessity

WARDLE& WOOD,supra note 39, at 53.
92. As Ruth Bader Ginsburg stated:
The 7-2 judgment in Roe v. Wade declared "violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" a Texas criminal abortion
statute that "[excepted] from criminality only a life saving procedure on
behalf of the [pregnant woman]." Suppose the Court had stopped there,
thus declaring unconstitutional the most extreme brand of law in the
nation, and had not gone on, as the Court did in Roe, to fashion a regime blanketing the subject, a set of rules that displaced virtually every
state law then in force? Would there have been the 20-year controversy
we have witnessed, reflected most recently in the Supreme Court's splintered decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey? A less encompassing Roe, I
believe . . . might have served to reduce rather than to he1 controversy.
Excerpts from Ginsburg Speeches, Decisions, N.Y.LJ.,June 15, 1993, at 2.
93. In my own discussions with those who are proponents of abortion rights,
I have yet to find anyone who would say that abortion is something that is good
for the woman or something that every woman should experience. They agree that
abortion represents a failure: a failure in planning, a failure in the birth control
method used, a failure in conceiving a child free of birth defeds, a failure of the
mother's body to safely withstand childbearing, a failure of the relationship between the man and woman, et.. However, what we disagree on is whether the
availability of abortion as an alternative for traditional methods of b i i h control for
women is good.
94. It is not realistic that our pluralistic society could achieve true communal
solidarity and unity of social purpose for such an issue. See Lawrence B. Solum,
Pluralism and Modernity, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 93, 95 (1990).
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for abortion as an alternative to traditional methods of birth
control.
To see the issue of abortion only in terms of the rights of
the fetus or of the rights of the woman skirts around the concerns central to a woman's decision whether to have an abortion. The only way t o persuade women t o not have abortions is
to first attempt t o see life through their eyes and then work
towards solutions for their particular problem^.'^ For the individual woman, the focus is on her alternatives and the consequences of those alternatives, not on her or her child's rights.
Thus, progress in the abortion context can only occur when
both sides of the abortion debate agree t o look beyond their
own rhetoric and generalities and look to specific situations for
ways to address the abortion problem, both short- and longterm.
A first step in effectuating true social change is persuading
women that they can have meaningful opportunities to pursue
their goals of self-realization without using abortion as an
optional method of birth control. For them t o be persuaded,
women need to feel confident that having and raising children
will not be a burden that they alone must bear. Therefore, the
first strategy should encompass ways to restructure society so
that women will have meaningful support-psychologically,
economically and morally-in the bearing and rearing of their
children. It is inappropriate and indeed callous for society to
force women to bear children by prohibiting abortions without
providing concomitant relief for the certain burdens that go
along with childbirth and ~hildrearing.'~
I view the following legislative and societal changes as
providing the support women need and should receive: (1)businesses should be required to accommodate mothers and fathers'' who need t o spend time with their families by provid95. The multiplicity of reasons for choosing to have an abortion suggests
that even if one specific problem is solved, it will not be enough to
change most women's decision. . . This suggests that actions directed
toward helping women who are unintentionally pregnant avoid abortion would be most effective if tailored to the individual.
Torres & Forrest, supm note 13, at 175.
96. "Findings from [the survey on why women have abortions] indicate that
eliminating (or even substantially reducing the number of) abortions once women
have become unintentionally pregnant will be very dimcult, if not impossible, because the reasons women turn to abortion are so numerous and varied." Id. at
176.
97. It is important for businesses to recognize that men share responsibility

.
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ing flexible schedules and leave time for new parents; (2) parents who choose to continue working while raising their children should not be penalized by being taken off the promotion
track; and (3) government needs to assist in establishing safe,
high-quality, low-cost child care centers. These changes will
provide women with some flexibility, enabling them to achieve
their career goals and aspirations without sacrificing their own
or their children's well-being. As for women who abort because
of rejection by family members, economic difficulties or unstable relationships, centers should be established to provide shelter and medical treatment during their pregnancy. Opportunities for education and job training should be made available to
them to assist them in becoming financially independent. The
money spent by businesses and society a t large would be well
spent because i t would assist women in their self-realization
efforts, increase their contributions to society, and provide the
children with an environment which prepares them to become
productive members of society.
In addition to legislative efforts to provide women support,
the legal system must better enforce existing laws that condemn men's oppression of women. Our legal system needs to be
more sensitive to victims of rape and other forms of sexual
abuse and enforce the laws more stringently against the perpetrators. Individuals who rape and/or commit incest should receive punishment commensurate with their crime. The perpetrators, rather than the victims, should suffer the shame, humiliation and rejection resulting from their crime. Additionally,
a better system needs to be put in place to make non-custodial
fathers financially accountable.'8
However, accountability should not stop there; a fair system would also require the men to become more accountable by
requiring them t o become "good samaritans" in the raising of
their children?' Arguably, a law prohibiting men and women
from using abortion as an alternative to traditional methods of
birth control does not overstep the boundary between the rights
of the individual and the rights of society a t large. Without its
children, in quality and in quantity, society is doomed to extinction. As future wage earners and taxpayers, children play a
vital role in preserving the societal infrastructure. Consequentfor childrearing that goes beyond providing financial support.
98. See supra note 5 .
99. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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ly, it is only reasonable that society seek ways to protect its
children, both born and unborn.
Although such legislation is a n important first step in
acknowledging the fact that women suffer inequalities, it is not
altogether effective in changing the societal value systems from
which the inequalities stem. Generally, the law only reflects a
society's prevailing values, beliefs and mores; it cannot create
them. If there is a societal belief that devalues women and
their contributions, legislation may initially provide some relief
for women,lM but ultimately, there must be a conscious dismantling of the value systems in place which operate to subordinate women to men. It is not enough for society to say that
women should not allow themselves to get pregnant without
first changing the social culture that subordinates women and
makes them vulnerable sexually to men.l0' 'Women are socialized to be compliant and accommodating, sensitive to the
feelings of others, and frightened of physical power; men are
socialized to take advantage of every opportunity to engage in
sexual intercourse and to use sex to express dominance and
power."102 Since legislation alone is insufficient, society must
use the power of socialization positively to abolish the subordination of women.
Abortion, like the sexual revolution, will not free women
from their subordination and enslavement.lo3 Instead, it can
only serve to exchange one type of bondage for another.lo4
Aborting the unborn may give women more flexibility i n their
100. Catharine M a c K i ~ o ndefined women's rights "in the negative as a boundary protection to freedom of individual action and says 'no amount of negative
freedom legally guaranteed to the [oppressed] group will make it the equal of the
first [group].'" Susan G. Kupfer, Autonomy and Community in Feminist Legal
Thought, 22 GOLDENGATE U. L. REV. 583, 594 (1992) (quoting CATHARINE
A.
MACKINNON,
TOWARDA FEMINISTW R Y OF THE STATE164 (1989)).
Women's subordinate status often prevents them from refusing men
sexual access t o their bodies. . . . [Plregnancy often forces women to
become dependent on particular men. Because a woman's dependence
on a man is assumed to entail her continued sexual loyalty to him,
restriction of abortion serves to commit women to remaining sexually
accessible to particular men and thus helps to perpetuate the cycle of
oppression.
SHERWIN,supra note 8, at 103.
102. Id. at 103-04.
103. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
104. See generally George Weigel, Women Reap the Rewards of Xoe' in Abuse,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1992, at M5, reprinted in HUM. LIFE REV., Winter 1993, at
97 (suggesting that "spousal abuse, rape, 'trading in' older wives for younger models, [and] the feminization of poverty" are linked with the Roe decision).
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personal life choices, but when women make these types of
personal life decisions, the overwhelming majority of them are
afErming the same self-centered, atomistic attitude that many
feminists find objectionable in men.lo5 Further, abortion as a
birth control option does not eliminate the domination and
oppression many women facelo6 and consequently does not
necessarily represent a meaningful choice107to the next woman who is at that same crossroad of decision.lo8
We need t o make an effort to effect true social change to
solve the problems that cause the demand for abortion. A subtle tragedy of abortion is the failure of a society to take care of
its own to the point that both men and women alike honestly
believe that abortion is the only answer. I believe efforts should
be made at the grass roots level to change the heart and mind
of society so that it can better appreciate the intrinsic value of
its female members. In the final analysis, the lives of unborn
children should not hinge on the ability of women t o have re-

105. Critical legal studies theorists join with radical feminists to construct
the following syllogism: individualism maximizes the selfkh, atomistic
goals of (male normed) beings, leads to a concern for rights which
protect the privileges gained against the state or the claims of others
within the community and defeats collective movement for social
change. Some see rights as alienating in themselves, creating a situation where there is no possibility of true community.
Kupfer, supra note 100, at 595 (footnote omitted).
106. In feminist terms, [Roe] translates the ideology of the private sphere
into the individual woman's legal right to privacy as a means of subordinating women's collective needs to the imperatives of male supremacy.

....
. . . [Ulnder

conditions of gender inequality, [Roe] does not free
women, it frees male sexual aggression. The availability of abortion
. . . removes the one remaining legitimized reason that women have
had for refbsing sex besides the headache.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Roe v. Wade: A Study in Male Ideology, in ABORTION:
MORALAND LEGALPERSPECTIVES
45, 49-51 (Jay L. Garfield & Patricia Hennessey
eds. 1984).
107. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
108. In fad, because of the ease of procurement and the relative low cost of
abortion, many women will succumb to an abortion, not because it is their personal decision but because of pressure from others. See supra note 34. It is my contention that many women abort their unborn because they believe that it is expected of them; to do otherwise would be selfish and not provide the best environment
for the child. Although women have other alternatives besides abortion, they are
not viable because of these external pressures. As long as women continue to succumb to such pressures rather than demand respect for their decision to carry
their fetus to term and demand support during their pregnancy, women will not
have meaningful choice.
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productive freedom, but rather on the ability of women to experience freedom in the purest sense of the word.
In order to experience this type of freedom, first, women
must awaken to the fact that their ability to bear children is
not a curse hindering them from achieving self-realization. Nor
is this ability something t o be taken lightly, with no deliberate
effort given t o responsible action and foreplanning. The ability
to physically bear children is a unique and special gift that
only women have and childbearing and childrearing are two of
life's greatest experiences.
Second, women should push for a shift in societal values,
urging society to give the proper deference to motherhood and
women's equality in general. Sexual promiscuity of both men
and women, done under the guise of sexual freedom, reinforces
the notion that women, and more particularly, their bodies, are
provided for the pleasure of men. Currently, contributions by
women, whether maternal, intellectual or otherwise, are discounted and de~alued.''~When women begin to value themselves, not in reference t o men,"' but for what they are intrinsically and for all their unique qualities and abilities, then
they can be a force in urging men and society in general to give
equal credence to them-not because they have become like
men-but because as women they have, in and of themselves,
inherent value."' The reinstilling of moral values and virtues
109. See i e a note 111 and accompanying text.
110. A person's social worth should not be determined by someone else. Instead, a person's quality of life should be defined by their individual moral expression that gives their life meaning. In defining the appropriate region of human
liberty, John Stuart Mill stated that
[ilt comprises, fist, the inward domain of consciousness, demanding liberty of conscience in the most comprehensive sense, liberty of thought and
feeling, absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. . . . Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits, of framing the plan of our
life to suit our own character, of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow, without impediment from our fellow creatures, so
long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think
our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong.
MILL, supra note 89, at 11-12 (emphasis added).
111. Since the effect of sexist or patriarchical experience in our culture is
to demean, marginalize and subordinate women, it seems necessary to
undo that damage, to rekindle the individual sense of self-worth before undertaking the dismantling of the cultural constructs. It is mcult to see how the collective experience can fuel movement toward
change without attainment of autonomy for individual women.
Kupfer, supra note 100, at 598.

'
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that promote self-esteem and care for others should be promoted through education, through laws that encourage and compel
non-custodial parents t o financially provide for their children,
and most importantly, through laws that promote and encourage equal employment opportunities among the populace.
Third, along with true equality for women, efforts should
be made to reverse the trend in which people determine what
quality of life is sufficient in order to have a human being's life
considered worth living. It is indeed a sad commentary that a
society, supposedly compassionate and enlightened, would permit any group of individuals to decide whether another human
being should live or be born. Who among us living today understands the meaning and purpose-oflife such that we feel qualified to find that someone cannot live up to that standard? How
can we determine with any degree of certainty whether their
contribution (or potential contribution if unborn) is so insignificant and devoid of value that it would be better for everyone
that they die or never be born? Further, once we commit to this
line of reasoning, how can we rebut another's contention that
we do not measure up t o his or her understanding of what life
is and should be?'12 It is true that to allow those who are not
fully functional or independent to live or be born will create a
burden113on those around them, but then again, we have all
been burdens at some point in time and, if we live long enough,
we will be burdens again.ll4
112. President Lincoln saw the danger in allowing one group of individuals to
determine the rights of others when he asked:
If A. can prove, however conclusively, that he may, of right, enslave
B.-why may not B. snatch the same argument, and prove equally, that
he may enslave A?You say A. is white, and B. is black. It is color, then; the lighter,
having the right to enslave the darker? Take care. By this rule, you are
to be slave to the first man you meet, with a fairer skin than your own.
You do not mean color exactly?-You mean the whites are intellectually the superiors of the blacks, and, therefore have the right to enslave
them? Take care again. By this rule, you are to be slave to the first man
you meet, with an intellect superior to your own.
But, say you, it is a question of interest; and, if you can make it your
interest, you have the right to enslave another. Very well. And if he can
make it his interest, he has the right to enslave you.
Abraham Lincoln, Fragment on Slavery, in 2 THE COLLECTED
WORKSOF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN,
1848-1858, supra note 33, at 222, 222-23.
113. It is my belief that not all burdens are negative in their impact on the
provider. For example, there may be spiritual or emotional benefits to people caring for those often considered burdensome.
114. Indeed, each one of us, through our decisions and our very being, impact
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It has been said that those who argue for the rights of the
fetus to be carried to term have a 'love affair with the fet ~ s " "but
~ no concern for the rights or well-being of children
once they are born.ll6 While it is true that society has not
done a good job in protecting its children fkom abuse, it must
be conceded that society is not comprised solely of pro-life individuals; the pro-choice contingent needs to accept some of the
blame itself. A lot of money has been raised through private
efforts to protect the rights of women to have abortions; media
coverage abounds on the pro-choice and "safe sex" messages.
Why do we not see this same demonstration of commitment
and support, financially and otherwise, to stopping rape, child
abuse and promiscuous sex? Are we not a t all concerned about
eradicating the problem that gives rise to the symptoms? Although problem eradication takes a long-term focus and women
considering abortion will not receive as much, or any, benefit as
the "short-term fix" that abortion would allow, women as a
group will benefit in the long run as beneficiaries of a more enlightened, compassioned society which protects and values each
of its members.
In such a society, the role of the legal system should be t o
ensure that everyone's rights, as evidenced by the societal value structures, are protected. Consequently, it is of utmost importance that the societal value structures stress the sanctity of
life and the intrinsic value of all its members. In addition, the
value structure should not permit the making of laws that
enable people to escape responsibility for their actions."'

those around us, both positively and negatively. This impact can be viewed by
others as a burden upon them because it forces them to make changes and adjustments in their lives. Notwithstanding this view, we still assert our right-not only
to live, but to live our way despite the effects on others.
115. "On Jaduary] 18, 1992, [Dr. Joycelyn] Elders told the Arkansas Coalition
for Choice, We would like for the right-to-life and anti-choice groups to really get
over their love affair with the fetus.'" Sherry Tyree, Is Anti-Catholicism 'Acceptable'
Bigotry?, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Sept. 22, 1993, at 7B.
116. If this is true, then it must also be true that those who see the issue of
abortion as embracing only the woman's rights have a "hate affair with the fetus"
because of their absolute resolve to place the desires of the woman paramount la
the life of her unborn child.
117. As Douglas Wilder, then-Governor of Virginia, noted:
More than ever, our young people must come to understand that
making mature decisions; making life-long commitments; making structured and loving families-rather than merely making babies; and making
the most of the opportunities that do exist in every aspect of life; these
are the actions that constitute the beginning of a passage into manhood.
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If we lived in an ideal world, there would be no abortions;
every child would indeed be a wanted child. However, the
world we live in is an imperfect one, where, if I must concede
anything to the pro-choice movement, the realities of today's
life offer little support to women in trouble.lls Consequently,
abortion is considered to be the most logical and viable option
for many of them. Nevertheless, living in an imperfect world
does not mandate the use of imperfect solutions.11gAbortion
is an imperfect solution because it does not correct or eradicate
the oppression and domination to which many women are subjected. Abortion can only eliminate one of many symptoms of
the oppression. If meaningful change is desired, then strategies
for change and equality for women must emphasize problem
eradication strategies rather than symptom elimination strategies alone. With symptom elimination strategies, the problem
remains yet becomes less obtrusive to people because they are
not confronted with the symptoms they find most offensive,
such as child abuse, unwanted children and poverty. However,
symptom elimination does not eliminate the child abuser, the
selfish reasons why children become unwanted or the poverty
mentality of materialistic people who seek more no matter how

....
But-as common sense tells us-there are precautions to be taken by
the young and by the unmarried, especially for those who know that they
are not remotely close to being ready for the unending responsibilities of
parenthood. If they want to have a future, it is imperative that our
young-male
and female alike-embrace
the ultimate precaution-abstinence. For as others have noted, "The essence of chastity is the
total orientation of one's life toward a goal," and-in this instance-that
goal must be a life of self-discipline, self-improvement and an abiding
spirit of selflessness-a willingness to work for the common good of family and community alike; to take full advantage of all opportunities which
do exist, and to make full use of the freedoms that are rightfully theirs.
L. Douglas Wilder, To Save the Black Family, the Young Must Abstain, WALLST.
J., Mar. 28, 1991, at A14, reprinted in HUM.LIFEREV.,Spring 1991, at 108, 10809.
118. See supra note 34.
119. John Stuart Mill stated that
[hluman beings owe to each other help to distinguish the better from the
worse, and encouragement to choose the former and avoid the latter.
They should be for ever stimulating each other to increased exercise of
their higher faculties, and increased direction of their feelings and aims
towards wise instead of foolish, elevating instead of degrading, objects and
contemplations.
MILL,
supra note 89, at 74.
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much they already have. In fact, by not eliminating the problem, new symptoms become manifest t o take the place of those
previously eliminated.
It can be argued that problem eradication is unrealistic
and can never be achieved. However, along with seeking t o
eliminate the problem, problem eradication strategies operate
under the assumption that humanity's position is not hopeless,
therefore serving t o inspire the populace to adopt a less reactionary stance when confronted by life circumstances. It is at
this point where the individual, whether male or female, is
truly free in making a choice. The circumstances do not dictate
the course of action; the individual does.
That is why it is necessary that with legislative rather
than judicial action, emphasis should be placed on changing the
heart and mind of society to care for those in need (problem
eradication) rather than upon abortion rights (symptom elimination). Although this approach has a long-term focus and does
not provide the immediate "benefit" abortion offers, I believe it
is the more lasting one and the only one in which women will
ever become truly free.

